Public Good Agreements under the Weakest-link Technology by Caparros, Alejandro & Finus, Michael
        
Citation for published version:
Caparros, A & Finus, M 2016 'Public Good Agreements under the Weakest-link Technology' Bath Economics
Research Working Papers, vol. 52/16, Department of Economics, University of Bath, Bath, U. K.
Publication date:
2016
Document Version
Publisher's PDF, also known as Version of record
Link to publication
University of Bath
General rights
Copyright and moral rights for the publications made accessible in the public portal are retained by the authors and/or other copyright owners
and it is a condition of accessing publications that users recognise and abide by the legal requirements associated with these rights.
Take down policy
If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact us providing details, and we will remove access to the work immediately
and investigate your claim.
Download date: 13. May. 2019
  
 
 
Public Good Agreements under the Weakest-link Technology 
 
Alejandro Caparros and Michael Finus  
 
No. 52 /16 
 
 
 
 
 
 
BATH ECONOMICS RESEARCH PAPERS 
 
 
 
 
Department of Economics  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Public Good Agreements
under the Weakest-link Technology
Alejandro Caparrós and Michael Finusy
Abstract
We analyze the formation of public good agreements under the weakest-link technol-
ogy. Cooperation on migration policies, money laundering measures and biodiversity
conservation e¤orts are prime examples of this technology. Whereas for symmetric
players, policy coordination is not necessary, for asymmetric players cooperation mat-
ters but fails, in the absence of transfers. In contrast, with an optimal transfer scheme,
asymmetry may not be an obstacle but an asset for cooperation. Counterintuitively, a
very skewed distribution of interests may allow even the grand coalition being stable.
We characterize various types and degrees of asymmetry and relate them to the stabil-
ity of agreements and associate gains from cooperation. We compare our results with
those obtained under the well-known summation technology and demonstrate that they
can be derived under much more general conditions.
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1 Introduction
There are many cases of global and regional public goods for which the decision in one juris-
diction has consequences for other jurisdictions and which are not internalized via markets.
As Sandler (1998), p. 221, points out: Technology continues to draw the nations of the
world closer together and, in doing so, has created novel forms of public goods and bads that
have diminished somewhat the relevancy of economic decisions at the nation-state level.
The coordination of migration policies, the stabilization of nancial markets, the ghting of
contagious diseases and the e¤orts of non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction have
gained importance through globalization and the advancement of technologies.
A central aspect in the theory of public goods is to understand the incentive structure that
typically leads to the underprovision of public goods as well as the possibilities of rectifying
this. In this paper, we pick up the research question already posed by Cornes (1983), namely
how cooperative institutions develop under di¤erent aggregation technologies, also called
social composition functions. Among the three typical examples, summation, best-shot and
weakest-link, we focus on the latter.1 Weakest-link means that the benets from public good
provision depends on the smallest contribution. Examples include the classical example in
Hirschleifer (1983) of building dykes against ooding, but also coordination of migration
policies within the EU, compliance with minimum standards in marine law or enforcing
targets for scal convergence in a monetary union, measures against money laundering,
ghting a re which threatens several communities, curbing the spread of an epidemic and
maintaining the integrity of a network (Arce 2001 and Sandler 1998). Also protecting species
whose habitat covers several countries is best described as a weakest-link public good.
For our analysis, we combine approaches from two strands of literature, which have
developed almost independently: the literature on non-cooperative or privately provided
public goods under the weakest-link technology and the literature on cooperatively provided
public goods under the summation technology. The later literature on cooperative public
good agreements is an application of a broader literature on coalition formation in the
presence of externalities where we focus on approaches belonging to non-cooperative coalition
theory. We subsequently review these two strands of literature in section 2, set out our model
in section 3 and derive some general results regarding the second (section 4) and rst stage
(section 5) of our two-stage coalition formation model, according to the sequence of backward
induction. Since it turns out that the most interesting results are obtained for the assumption
of asymmetric players in the presence of transfers, we devote Section 6 to a detailed analysis
1Better shot (weaker link) is a modication of the best shot (weakest link) technology where the marginal
e¤ect of an individual contribution on the global provision level decreases (increases) with the level of the
contribution. For a formal exposition, see for instance Cornes (1993) and Cornes and Hartely (2007a,b).
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on the type and degree of asymmetry which fosters stability and how this relates to the
welfare gains from cooperation. Section 7 concludes. Along the way, we will argue that the
results for coalition formation and the weakest-link technology are far more general than and
di¤erent from those which have been obtained for the summation technology.
2 Relevant Literature
2.1 Non-cooperative Public Good Provision under the Weakest-
Link Technology
The rst strand of literature on non-cooperative public good provision has taken basically
three approaches in order to understand the incentive structure under the weakest-link tech-
nology.
The rst approach is informal and argues that the least interested player in the public
good provision is essentially the bottleneck, which denes the equilibrium provision and
which is matched by all others who mimic the smallest e¤ort (e.g. Sandler and Arce 2002
and Sandler 2006). Moreover, it is argued that either a third party or the most well-o¤
players should have an incentive to support the least well-o¤ through monetary or in-kind
transfers in order to increase the provision level.
The second approach is a formal approach (Cornes 1993, Cornes and Hartley 2007a,b,
Vicary 1990, and Vicary and Sandler 2002). It is shown that there is no unique Nash equi-
librium for the weakest-link technology, though Nash equilibria can be Pareto-ranked. It
is demonstrated that except if players are symmetric, Nash equilibria are Pareto-ine¢ cient.
Improvements to this outcome are not considered in the form of coalitions but only by
allowing monetary transfers between individual players. Because this changes playersen-
dowments, it may also change their Nash equilibrium strategies as income neutrality does no
longer hold (as this is the case under the summation technology). For su¢ ciently di¤erent
preferences, this may increase the weakest players provision level which may constitute a
Pareto-improvement to all players. In some models (e.g. Cornes and Hartley 2007b and
Vicary and Sandler 2002), which allow for di¤erent prices across players (the marginal op-
portunity costs in the form of foregone consumption of the private good), this is reinforced
if the recipients face a lower price than the donor. In Vicary and Sandler (2002) it is also in-
vestigated how the Nash equilibrium provision level changes if monetary transfers are either
substituted or complemented by in-kind transfers.
Finally, the third approach considers various forms of formal and informal cooperative
agreements, established for instance through a correlation device implemented by a third
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party, leadership and evolutionary stable strategies (e.g. Arce 2001, Arce and Sandler 2001
and Sandler 1998).
Our paper di¤ers from this literature because it focuses on institution formation, and it
improves upon this literature in three respects. Firstly, we combine a coalition formation
model with general payo¤ functions and continuous strategies. Hence, our analysis of coop-
eration is not based on examples or simple matrix games (e.g. prisonersdilemma, chicken
or assurance games) with discrete strategies like the third approach, for which the generality
of results is in doubt. Instead, we continue in the rigorous tradition of the second approach
but consider not only Nash but also coalition equilibria. Secondly, we can measure the
degree of underprovision not only in physical but also in welfare terms, allowing us to go
beyond physical measures, like Allais-Debreu measure of waste, as used by Cornes (1993).
Admittedly, this is easier in our TU-framework as equilibrium strategies are not a¤ected by
monetary transfers. Thirdly, our model allows not only for di¤erent marginal costs but also
non-constant marginal costs of public good provision. However, in order to remain at a high
level of generality, we do not consider in-kind transfers as some papers have done as they
basically transform the weakest-link into a summation technology for which general results
are di¢ cult to obtain in the context of coalition formation.
2.2 Cooperative Public Good Provision under the Summation
Technology
The second strand of literature on cooperative public good provision under the summation
technology can be traced back to Barrett (1994) and Carraro and Siniscalco (1993). This
literature has grown substantially (see e.g. Battaglini and Harstad (2016) for one of the
most recent papers) since then, and the most inuential papers are collected in a recent
volume by Finus and Caparrós (2015) with an extensive survey. Within this literature, the
non-cooperative approach is an application of a general theory of non-cooperative coalition
formation in the presence of externalities as summarized in Bloch (2003) and Yi (1997). A
general conclusion is that the size and success of stable coalitions depends on some funda-
mental properties of the underlying economic problem. It has been shown that problems can
be broadly categorized into positive versus negative externalities (Bloch 2003 and Yi 1997).
In positive (negative) externality games, players not involved in the enlargement of coalitions
are better (worse) o¤ through such a move. Hence, in positive externalities games, typically,
only small coalitions are stable, as players have an incentive to stay outside coalitions. Typ-
ical examples of positive externalities include output and price cartels and the provision of
public goods under the summation technology. If an output cartel receives new members,
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other players benet from lower output by the cartel via higher market prices. This is also
the driving force in price cartels where the price increases with the accession of new members.
In a public good agreement, players not involved in the expansion of a coalition benet from
higher provision levels but lower costs. In contrast, in negative externality games, outsiders
have an incentive to join coalitions and therefore most coalition models predict the grand
coalition as a stable outcome. Examples include trade agreements, which impose tari¤s on
imports from outsiders or R&D-collaboration among rms in imperfectly competitive mar-
kets where members gain a comparative advantage over outsiders if the benets from R&D
accrue exclusively to coalition members.
Until now non-cooperative coalition theory has mainly assumed symmetric agents due
to the complexity which coalition formation adds to the analysis (see the surveys by Bloch
2003 and Yi 1997). In the context of positive externalities, general predictions about stable
coalitions are di¢ cult. It is for this reason that most papers on international agreements
assume particular payo¤ functions and despite symmetry have to rely on simulations. Hence,
not surprising, also for asymmetric agents not many analytical results have been obtained
and the few exceptions assume particular functional forms and typically restrict the analysis
to two types of players (e.g. Fuentes-Albero and Rubio 2010 and Pavolova and de Zeeuw
2013). Our paper di¤ers from this literature in two fundamental respects. Firstly, none of
the papers has investigated the weakest-link technology. Secondly, we demonstrate that for
this technology much more general but also very di¤erent results can be obtained compared
to the summation technology. We are able to characterize precisely the type and degree of
asymmetry that is conducive to larger stable coalitions, which includes the grand coalition.
In our conclusions (Section 7), we will argue that the simple coalition game we employ in
this paper is su¢ cient to derive all interesting results as more complicated games would not
add much to the analysis.
3 Model and Denitions
We consider the following payo¤ function of player i 2 N :
Vi(Q; qi) = Bi(Q)  Ci(qi) (1)
Q = min
i2N
fqig
where N denotes the set of players and Q denotes the public good provision level, which is
the minimum over all players under the weakest-link technology. The individual provision
level of player i is qi. Payo¤s comprise benets, Bi(Q), and costs, Ci(qi). Externalities across
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players are captured through Q on the benet side.
In order to appreciate some features of the weakest-link technology, we will occasionally
relate results to the classical assumption of a summation technology. The subsequent de-
scription of the model and its assumptions are general enough to apply to both technologies.
For the summation technology, only Q = mini2N fqig has to be replaced by Q =
P
j2N qj in
payo¤ function (1).2 All important results of the summation technology mentioned in the
course of the discussion are summarized in Appendix A.
Regarding the components of the payo¤ function, we make the following assumptions
where primes denote derivatives.
Assumption 1: For all i 2 N : B0i > 0, B00i  0, C 0i > 0; C 00i > 0 . Furthermore, we
assume Bi(0) = Ci(0) = 0 and limQ!0B0i(Q) > limq!0C
0
i(q) > 0.
These assumptions are very general. They ensure the strict concavity of all payo¤ func-
tions and existence of an interior equilibria as explained below. For the following denitions,
it is convenient to abstract from the aggregation technology and simply write Vi(q), stressing
that payo¤s depend on the entire vector of contributions, q = (q1; q2; :::; qN); which may also
be written as q = (qi; q i) where the superscript of q i indicates that this is not a single
entry but a vector, comprising all provision levels except of player i, qi.
Following dAspremont et al. (1983), the coalition formation process unfolds as follows.
Denition 1 Cartel Formation Game In the rst stage, all players simultaneously choose
a membership strategy. All players who choose to remain outside coalition S act as single
players and are called non-signatories or non-members, and all players who choose to join
coalition S form coalition S  N and are called signatories or members. In the second
stage, simultaneously, all non-signatories maximize their individual payo¤ Vj(q), and all
signatories jointly maximize their aggregate payo¤
P
i2S Vi(q).
Note that due to the simple nature of the cartel formation game, a coalition structure, i.e.
a partition of players, is completely characterized by coalition S as all players not belonging
to S act as singletons. The coalition acts like a meta-player, internalizing the externality
among its members. The assumption of joint welfare maximization of coalition members
implies a transferable utility framework (TU-framework). The cartel formation game is
solved by backwards induction, assuming that players play a Nash equilibrium in each stage
and hence a subgame-perfect equilibrium with respect to the entire game. In order to save
on notation, we assume in this section that the second stage equilibrium vector for every
2More precisely, we mean a summation technology with equal weights, which we assume throughout the
paper and therefore will not stress anymore.
5
coalition S  N (denoted by q(S) in Denition 2 below) is a unique interior equilibrium,
even though this will be established later in Section 4.
Denition 2 Subgame-perfect Equilibrium in the Cartel Formation Game
(i) First Stage:
a) Assuming no monetary transfers in the second stage, coalition S is called stable if
internal stability: V i (S)  V i (S n fig) 8 i 2 S and
external stability: V j (S)  V j (S [ fjg) 8 j =2 S hold simultaneously.
b) Assuming monetary transfers in the second stage, coalition S is called stable if
internal stability : V Ti (S)  V Ti (S n fig) 8 i 2 S and
external stability : V Tj (S)  V Tj (S [ fjg) 8 j =2 S hold simultaneously.
(ii) Second Stage:
For a given coalition S that has formed in the rst stage, let q(S) denote the (unique)
simultaneous solution toX
i2S
Vi(q
(S)) 
X
i2S
Vi(q
S(S); q S(S))
Vj(q
(S))  Vj(qj(S); q j(S)) 8 j =2 S
for all qS(S) 6= qS(S) and qj(S) 6= qj (S).
a) In the case of no monetary transfers, equilibrium payo¤s are given by Vi(q(S)), or V i (S)
for short.
b) In the case of monetary transfers, equilibrium payo¤s, V Ti (q
(S)), or V Ti (S) for short,
for all signatories i 2 S are given by V Ti (S) = V i (S n fig) + iS(S) with S(S) :=P
i2S(V

i (S)   V i (S n fig)) , i  0 and
P
i2S i = 1 and for all non-signatories j =2 S by
V Tj (S) = V

j (S).
Let us rst comment on the second stage. Note that the equilibrium provision vector is
a Nash equilibrium between coalition S and all the single players in N n S. Only because
of our assumption of uniqueness, we are allowed to write V i (S) instead of Vi(q
(S)). As we
assume a TU-game, monetary transfers do not a¤ect equilibrium provision levels. Transfers
are only paid among coalition members, exhausting all (without wasting any) resources
generated by the coalition. Non-signatories neither pay nor receive monetary transfers. The
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"all singleton coalition structure", i.e. all players act as singletons, subsequently denoted by
ffig; fjg; :::fzgg, replicates the non-cooperative or Nash equilibrium provision vector known
from games without coalition formation. It emerges if either only one player or no player
announces to join coalition S. By the same token, the grand coalition, i.e. the coalition which
comprises all players, is identical to the socially optimal provision vector, sometimes also
called the full cooperative outcome. Hence, our coalition game covers these two well-known
benchmarks, apart from partial cooperative outcomes where neither the grand coalition
nor the all singleton coalition structure forms. Moreover note that the monetary transfer
scheme which we consider is the "optimal transfer scheme" proposed by Eyckmans and
Finus (2004).3 Every coalition member receives his free-rider payo¤ plus a share i of the
total surplus S(S), which is the di¤erence between the total payo¤ of coalition S and the
sum over all free-rider payo¤s if a player i leaves coalition S. In other words, S(S) is the
sum of individual coalition members incentive to stay in (i(S)  0) or leave (i(S) < 0)
coalition S, i(S) := V i (S)   V i (S n fig), which must be positive for internal stability at
the aggregate, i.e. S(S) =
P
i2S i  0. Thus, the transfer scheme has some resemblance
with the Nash bargaining solution in TU-games, though the threat points are not the Nash
equilibrium payo¤s but the payo¤s if a player leaves coalition S. The shares i can be
interpreted as weights, reecting bargaining power. They matter for the actual payo¤s of
individual coalition members, but do not matter for the stability (or instability) of coalition
S because stability only depends on S(S). Henceforth, when we talk about transfers, we
mean transfers included in the class dened by the optimal transfer scheme.
Let us have now a closer look at the rst stage. Note that internal and external sta-
bility denes a Nash equilibrium in terms of membership strategies. All players who have
announced to join coalition S should have no incentive to change their announcement to stay
outside S (internal stability) and all players who have announced to remain outside S should
have no incentive to announce to join S instead, given the equilibrium announcements of all
other players. Due to the fact that the singleton coalition structure can always be supported
as a Nash equilibrium in the membership game if all players announce to stay outside S
(as a change of the strategy by one player would make no di¤erence), existence of a stable
coalition is guaranteed. We denote a coalition which is internally and externally stable and
hence stable by S. In the case of the monetary transfer scheme considered here, it is easy to
see that, by construction, if S  0, then coalition S is internally stable and if S < 0, then
neither this transfer scheme nor any other scheme could make coalition S internally stable.
Further note that internal and external stability are linked: if coalition S is not externally
3Similar notions have been considered by Fuentes-Albero and Rubio (2010), McGinty (2007) and Weikard
(2009).
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stable because player j has an incentive to join, then coalition coalition S [fjg is internally
stable regarding player j. Loosely speaking, the transfer scheme considered here is optimal
subject to the constraint that coalitions have to be stable.4
In the following, we introduce some properties which are useful in evaluating the success
and incentive structure of coalition formation.5
Denition 3 E¤ectiveness of a Coalition A coalition S is (strictly) e¤ective with respect
to coalition S n fig, S  N , jSj  2 if Q(S)  (>) Q(S n fig). The coalition game is
(strictly) e¤ective if this holds for all S  N and all i 2 N .
Denition 4 Superadditivity, Positive Externality and Cohesiveness
(i) A coalition game is (strictly) superadditive if for all S  N , jSj  2 and all i 2 S:X
i2S
V i (S)  (>)
X
i2Snfig
V i (S n fig) + V i (S n fig)
(ii) A coalition game exhibits a (strict) positive externality if for all 8S  N , jSj  2 and
for all j 2 N n S:
V j (S)  (>)V j (S n fig):
(iii) A game is (strictly) cohesive if for all S  N :X
i2N
V i (fNg)  (>)
X
i2S
V i (S) +
X
j2NnS
V j (S)
(iv) A game is (strictly) fully cohesive if for all S  N , and jSj  2:X
i2S
V i (S) +
X
j2NnS
V j (S)  (>)
X
i2Snfig
V i (S n fig) +
X
j2NnS[fig
V j (S n fig):
Denition 3 allows us to evaluate provision levels of di¤erent coalitions, in particular
4Every coalition S which is internally stable without transfers will also be internally stable with optimal
transfers. However, the reverse is not true. Thus, if we can show that the coalition game exhibits a property
called full cohesiveness (see Denition 4), i.e. the aggregate payo¤ payo¤ over all players increases with the
enlargement of a coalition, then the global payo¤ of the stable coalition with the highest global payo¤ among
the set of stable coalitions under an optimal transfer scheme is (weakly) higher than without transfers (or
any other transfer scheme). Hence, optimal transfers have the potential to improve upon the global payo¤
of stable coalitions. For details see Eyckmans et al. (2012).
5Note that for Denitions 3 and 4 transfers do not matter. Firstly, equilibrium provision levels are not
a¤ected by transfers in our setting. Secondly, we look either at the aggregate payo¤ over all players or
the aggregate payo¤ over all coalition members, and non-signatories neither pay nor receive transfers by
assumption.
8
compared to the situation when there is no cooperation. Note that full cohesiveness is the
counterpart to e¤ectiveness in welfare terms.
In Denition 4 all four properties are related to each other. For instance, a coalition
game which is superadditive and exhibits positive externalities is fully cohesive and a game
which is fully cohesive is cohesive. Typically, a game with externalities is cohesive, with
the understanding that in a game with externalities the strategy of at least one player
has an impact on the payo¤ of at least one other player. The reason is that the grand
coalition internalizes all externalities by assumption.6 Cohesiveness also motivates the choice
of the social optimum as a normative benchmark, and it appears to be the basic motivation
to investigate stability and outcomes of cooperative agreements. A stronger motivation is
related to full cohesiveness, as it provides a sound foundation for the search for large stable
coalitions even if the grand coalition is not stable due to large free-rider incentives. The
fact that large coalitions, including the grand coalition, may not be stable in coalition games
with the positive externality property is well-known in the literature (e.g. see the surveys by
Bloch 2003 and Yi 1997). The positive externality can be viewed as a non-excludable benet
accruing to outsiders from cooperation. This property makes it attractive to stay outside the
coalition. This may be true despite superadditivity holds, a property which makes joining a
coalition attractive. In the context of a public good game with summation technology, stable
coalitions are typically small because with increasing coalitions, the positive externality
dominates the superadditivity e¤ect (e.g. see Finus and Caparrós 2015).7 Whether this is
also the case in the context of the weakest-link technology is one of the key research question
of this paper.
We close this section with a simple observation, which is summarized in the following
lemma.
Lemma 1 Individual Rationality and Stability Let a payo¤ be called individually ra-
tional if V i (S)  V i (ffig; fjg; :::fzgg) in the case of no transfers, respectively, V Ti (S) 
V Ti (ffig; fjg; :::fzgg) in the case of transfers. In a coalition game which exhibits a positive
externality, a necessary condition for internal stability of coalition S is that for all i 2 S
individual rationality must hold.
Proof: See Appendix B.1
6Cohesiveness could fail if there are diseconomies of scale from cooperation, e.g. due to transaction costs
which increase in the number of cooperating players. Our model abstracts from such complications.
7This is quite di¤erent in negative externality games. In Weikard (2009) it is shown that in a coalition
game with negative externalities and superadditivity the grand coalition is the unique stable equilibrium,
using the optimal transfer scheme in the case of asymmetric payo¤ functions.
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Note that in negative externality games, this conclusion could not be drawn. A player in
coalition S may be worse o¤ than in the all singleton coalition structure, but still better o¤
than when leaving the coalition.
4 Results of the Second Stage
4.1 Equilibrium Public Good Provision Levels
Generally speaking, the equilibrium strategy vector q(S) can have di¤erent entries. We now
develop the arguments that all entries are the same. For coalition members, it can never be
rational to choose di¤erent provision levels as any provision level larger than the smallest
provision level within the coalition would not a¤ect benets but would only increase costs.
Their optimal or "ideal" choice in isolation (Vicary 1990), or their "autarky" provision level,
is given by qAS , which follows from max
P
i2S Vi(qS) =)
P
i2S B
0
i(q
A
S ) =
P
i2S C
0
i(q
A
S ) in an
interior equilibrium which is ensured by Assumption 1. Non-signatoriesautarky provision
levels, qAj , follow from maxVj(qj) =) B0j(qAj ) = C 0j(qAj ) for all j =2 S.
In order to determine the overall equilibrium, some basic considerations are su¢ cient.
Neither the coalition nor the singleton players have an incentive to provide (strictly) more
than the smallest provision level over all players, Q = mini2N fqig, as this would not a¤ect
their benets but only increase their costs. They also have no incentive to provide (strictly)
less than Q as long as Q  qAj , respectively, Q  qAS , as they are at the upward sloping part
of their strictly concave payo¤ function. Strict concavity follows from Assumption 1 about
benet and cost functions (which ensure existence of an equilibrium). In the case of the
coalition, we just note that the sum of strictly concave functions is strictly concave. Finally,
players can veto any provision level above their autarky level. Thus, all players match Q as
long as this is weakly smaller than their autarky level.
The replacement functions, qi = Ri(Q) (which are a variation of best reply functions,
qi = ri(q i)), as introduced by Cornes and Hartley (2007a,b) as a convenient and elegant
way of displaying optimal responses in the case of more than two players, look like the ones
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drawn in Figure 1.8 ;9 The gure assumes a coalition with replacement function RS, and two
single players 1 and 2 with replacement functions R1 and R2, respectively. All replacement
functions start at the origin and slope up along the 45O-line up to the autarky level of a
player. At the autarky level, replacement functions have a kink and become horizontal lines,
as no player can be forced to provide more than his autarky level. Hence, public good
provision levels are strategic complements from the origin of the replacement functions up to
the point where replacement functions kink. Consequently, all points on the 45O-line up to
the lowest autarky level qualify as second stage equilibria (thick bold line). Thus, di¤erent
from the summation technology, the second stage equilibrium is not unique. However, due
to the strict concavity of all payo¤ functions, the smallest autarky level strictly Pareto-
dominates all provision levels which are smaller. Therefore, is seems natural to assume that
players play the Pareto-optimal equilibrium. Consequently, we henceforth assume this to be
the unique second stage equilibrium.10 In Appendix C.1 we relax this assumption, showing
that most results discussed in the main text hold under alternative assumptions (and we
also detail the results that would be modied).
[Figure 1 about here]
Proposition 1 Second Stage Equilibrium Provision Levels Suppose some coalition
S has formed in the rst stage. The second stage equilibrium provision levels are given by
8Exploiting the aggregative structure of Bergstrom et al.s (1986) non-cooperative public good model with
summation technology, and following the discussion in Bergstrom et al. (1992) and Fraser (1992), Corners
and Hartley (2007a) greatly simplify the proof of existence and uniqueness for the summation technology
by exploiting the replacement function. Essentially, their proof boils down to a graphical argument in the
qi-Q-space as drawn in Figure 1, though replacement functions would look very di¤erent. If the individual
replacement functions start at a positive level on the abscissa, are continuous and downward sloping over the
entire strategy space, the aggregate replacement function (which is the vertical aggregation of the individual
replacement functions for the summation technology) will have the same properties and it will intersect with
the 45o-line, only once. Thus, the intersection is the location of the unique Nash equilibrium.
9Using the technique of the replacement function, Corners and Hartley (2007b) analyze Nash equilibria
for the weakest-link public good technology, showing that any non-negative level of the public good which
does not exceed any individually preferred level is an equilibrium (and thus the game has a continuum of
Pareto ranked equilibria). As their argument only requires convex preferences, it also holds in our coalition
game. We only need to interpret coalition S as a single player for whom the aggregate preferences (as the
sum of individual memberspreferences) are convex. Note that reaction functions would also be upward
sloping.
10The discussion for selecting the Pareto-optimal equilibrium would be very similar as discussed in
Hirschleifer (1983) and Vicary (1990) in the context of Nash equilibria without coalition formation. As
pointed out by Hirschleifer (1983), and reiterated by Vicary (1990), this equilibrium would also emerge if
players choose their provision levels sequentially (and disclose their bids). In our context, this would be the
case if, say, the coalition would act as a Stackelberg leader and the non-signatories as Stackelberg followers
as in Barrett (1994). This also points to the fact that in our setting, there is no di¤erence between the
Stackelberg and Nash-Cournot assumption, which would be di¤erent for the summation technology. For
the summation technology, the Stackelberg assumption leads to larger coalitions than the Nash-Cournot
assumption (see Finus 2003 for an overview). Only if B
00
i = 0 will there be no di¤erence. The reason is that
Stackelberg leadership provides the coalition members with a strategic advantage compared to non-members.
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the interval qi (S) 2 [0; QA(S)], QA(S) = minfqAi ; qAj ; :::; qAS g and qi (S) = qj (S) = qS(S)
8i 6= j; i; j =2 S. Public good provision levels are strategic complements up to the minimum
autarky level QA(S). The unique Pareto-optimal second stage equilibrium among the set of
equilibria is qi (S) = q

j (S) = q

S(S) = Q
A(S) = Q(S) 8i 6= j; i; j =2 S.
Proof. Follows from the discussion above, including footnote 9.
Assumption 2 Among the set of second stage equilibria, the unique Pareto-optimal
equilibrium is played in the second stage.
It is evident that the summation technology would have very di¤erent properties. Re-
placement and reactions functions would be downward sloping and hence strategies are
strategic substitutes. Moreover, there is no need to invoke Pareto-dominance to select equi-
libria as the equilibrium would be unique.
A useful result for the following analysis of the weakest-link technology is summarized in
the following lemma.
Lemma 2 Coalition Formation and Autarky Provision Level Consider a coalition
S with autarky level qAS and a player i with autarky level q
A
i . If coalition S and player i
merge, such that S [ fig forms, then for the autarky level of the enlarged coalition, qAS[fig,
maxfqAS ; qAi g  qAS[fig  minfqAS ; qAi g holds, with strict inequalities if qAS 6= qAi .
Proof. The maximum of the sum of two strictly concave payo¤ functions is between the
maxima of the two individual payo¤ functions.
Lemma 2 is illustrated in Figure 1 with the replacement function of the enlarged coalition
denoted by RS[f1g, assuming player 1 merges with coalition S. Note that merging of several
players can be derived as a sequence of single accessions to coalition S.
4.2 Properties of the Public Good Coalition Game
For many of the subsequent proofs but also in order to understand generally how coalition
formation impacts on equilibrium provision levels, the following lemma is useful.
Lemma 3 Coalition Formation and E¤ectiveness Coalition formation in the public
good coalition game with the weakest-link technology is e¤ective.
Proof: See Appendix B.2
Lemma 3 is useful in that it tells us that the public good provision level never decreases
through a merger but may increase. It will strictly increase if the enlarged coalition contains
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the (strictly) weakest-link player (either the single player who joins the coalition or the
original coalition) whose autarky level before the merger was strictly below that of any other
player. Because not all expansions of a coalition are strictly e¤ective, the following properties
also only hold generally in its weak form.
Proposition 2 Positive Externality, Superadditivity and Full Cohesiveness The
public good coalition game with the weakest-link technology exhibits the properties positive
externality, superadditivity and full cohesiveness.
Proof: See Appendix B.3
Lemma 3 and Proposition 2 are interesting in themselves but can be even more ap-
preciated when compared with the summation technology. For the summation technology,
e¤ectiveness (with Q =
P
j2N qj) and the positive externality property would also hold,
though for a very di¤erent reason. Even though an expansion of the coalition also implied
that signatories increase their aggregate provision level, non-signatories would not increase
but decrease their provision level.11 Because slopes of the reaction functions would be larger
than  1, the overall provision level (strictly) increased. In other words, there would be
leakage but less than 100%. The positive externality would not hold because outsiders get
closer to their autarky provision level but because they take a free-ride. Non-signatories
benets increased through a higher total provision but their costs decreased as they would
have reduced their individual contribution (see previous footnote).
In contrast, superadditivity could not be established at a general level for the summation
technology, would require very restrictive assumptions to establish it and may in fact fail for
typical examples. This is particularly true if the slopes of reaction functions are steep and
coalitions are small so that free-riding is particularly pronounced. It is for this reason that
is di¢ cult to establish generally full cohesiveness for the summation technology, at least we
are not aware of any proof which is not based on the combination of superadditivity and
positive externalities.12
Considering all properties in Proposition 2 together with the view of predicting stable
coalitions in the rst stage, general conclusions are not straightforward. On the one hand,
also for the weakest-link technology the coalition game exhibits positive externalities, which
following the literature predicts small coalitions. On the other hand, superadditivity al-
ways holds and strategies are strategic complements and not substitutes which may provide
11For the special case of B
0
i = 0, the provision level of non-signatories would remain constant and hence also
their costs. Benets would strictly increase through a merger as the total provision level strictly increases.
12It is somehow disturbing that the non-cooperative coalition formation literature analyzes ways to estab-
lish large stable coalitions without clarifying whether full cohesiveness holds. This shortcoming is valid for
positive and negative externality games.
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some indication that agreements may be more successful for the weakest-link than for the
summation technology.13
5 Results of the First Stage
5.1 Symmetric Players
In order to analyze stability of coalitions, it is informative to start with the assumption of
symmetric players which is widespread in the literature due to the complexity of coalition
formation (see e.g. Bloch 2003 and Yi 1997 for overviews on this topic). Symmetry means
that all players have the same payo¤ function. This assumption, which is sometimes also
called ex-ante symmetry because, depending whether players are coalition members or non-
members, they may be ex-post asymmetric, i.e. have di¤erent equilibrium payo¤s. We follow
the mainstream assumption and ignore transfer payments for ex-ante symmetric players.14
Proposition 3 Symmetry and Stable Coalitions Assume payo¤ function (1) to be the
same for all players, i.e. all players are ex-ante symmetric, then all players (signatories
and non-signatories) are ex-post symmetric if coalition S forms, V i (S) = V

j (S) for all
i 6= j. Moreover, q(S) = q(S#) for all possible coalitions S 6= S#, S, S#  N and hence
V i (S) = V

i (S
#) for all i 2 N . Therefore, all coalitions are Pareto-optimal, socially optimal
and stable, and there is no need for cooperation.
Proof. Follows directly from Lemma 2 and applying the conditions of internal and external
stability.
Admittedly, Proposition 3 is less interesting when relating it to the literature on Nash
equilibria cited in the introduction for the weakest-link technology which already concludes
that there is no need for coordination for symmetric players. It is more interesting as a
benchmark for coalition formation and when relating it to the summation technology: there
would be a need for cooperation despite all players being ex-ante symmetric, though stable
13Note that convexity does generally not hold for the public good coalition game, neither for the summation
technology nor for the weakest-link technology. Convexity is a stronger property than superadditivity and
implies that the gains from cooperation increase at an increasing rate with membership. Hence, convexity
facilitates cooperation, an assumption frequently made in cooperative coalition theory, though, obviously,
not appropriate in our context.
14For most economic problems and ex-ante symmetric players, in equilibrium, all players belonging to
the group of signatories and all players belonging to the group of non-signatories chose the same economic
strategies in the second stage (though signatories and non-signatories choose typically di¤erent strategies).
Thus, all signatories receive the same payo¤, and the same is true among the group of non-signatories.
Consequently, transfers among signatories would create an asymmetry, which, though in theory possible,
would be di¢ cult to justify on economic grounds.
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coalitions tend to be small. Thus, in order to render the analysis interesting for the weakest-
link technology, we henceforth consider asymmetric players.
5.2 Asymmetric Players
In order to operationalize and to make the concept of ex-ante asymmetric players interesting,
we assume that autarky levels can be ranked as follows: qA1  qA2  :::  qAN with at least one
inequality sign being strict.15 Henceforth, when we talk about ex-ante asymmetry, we mean
this denition, without mentioning this explicitly anymore. We start with the assumption
of no transfers.
Proposition 4 Asymmetry, No Transfers and Instability of E¤ective Coalitions
Assume ex-ante asymmetric players and no transfers. a) All coalitions are Pareto-optimal,
i.e. moving from a coalition S  N to any coalition S#  N , S 6= S#; it is not possible
to strictly increase the payo¤ of at least one player without decreasing the payo¤ of at least
one other player. b) All strictly e¤ective coalitions with respect to the all singleton coalition
structure are not stable and all non-strictly e¤ective coalitions are stable.
Proof: See Appendix B.4
Interestingly, even though all coalition structures are Pareto-optimal, not a single coali-
tion is stable in the absence of transfers which strictly improves upon the non-cooperative
equilibrium. The reason is that a strictly e¤ective coalition requires membership of the
players with the smallest autarky level who are worse o¤ than when staying outside and
individual rationality is a necessary condition for internal stability in a positive external-
ity game. This is also one of the reason why all coalitions are Pareto-optimal (though not
socially optimal). Any move from a coalition S to some other coalition S# which changes
the provision level means either a lower payo¤ to those players with the smallest autarky
level if the provision level increases or to those with the largest autarky provision level if the
provision level decreases. Note that for the summation technology results would be more
ambiguous. The set of Pareto-optimal coalitions would normally only be a subset of all coali-
tions. In particular, the all singleton coalition structure would usually not be Pareto-optimal.
Moreover, depending on the degree of asymmetry and the particular payo¤ function, no, one
or some coalitions could be stable.
Given this unambiguous negative result for the weakest-link technology, we consider
transfers (always in the form of the optimal transfer scheme) in the subsequent analysis.
15Hence, we rule out the possibility (though unlikely) that all players have di¤erent payo¤ functions but
the same autarky level.
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At the most basic level, we can ask the question: will transfers strictly improve upon no
transfers? The answer is a¢ rmative.
Proposition 5 Asymmetry, Transfers and Existence of a Strictly E¤ective Stable
Coalition Assume ex-ante asymmetric players and transfers. Then there exists at least one
stable coalition S which Pareto-dominates the all singleton coalition structure with a strictly
higher provision level.
Proof: See Appendix B.5
Note that a general statement as in Proposition 5 would not be possible for the sum-
mation technology. Establishing existence of a non-trivial coalition with transfers requires
superadditivity but this property does not hold generally as pointed out above. However,
predicting which specic coalitions are stable for the weakest-link technology is also not
straightforward at this level of generality, though it turns out that our results are much
more general than those obtained for the summation technology.16 In the next section, we
analyze how the nature of asymmetry a¤ects stability. We rst lay out the basic analysis for
determining stable coalitions and then look into the details.
6 Stable Coalitions and the Nature of Asymmetry
6.1 General Considerations
In the context of the provision of a public good, it seems natural to worry more about
players leaving a coalition than joining it and hence one is mainly concerned about internal
stability. This is even more true because if coalition S is internally stable with transfers,
but not externally stable, then a coalition S [ fjg is internally stable, with a provision
level and a global payo¤ strictly higher than before.17 Hence, we focus on this dimension of
stability. Moreover, we consider only strictly e¤ective coalitions compared to the all singleton
coalition structure because all other coalitions are internally stable even without transfers
as stated in Proposition 4. Because of strict e¤ectiveness, all players with qAi = q
A
1 must
be members of S, qA1  qA2  :::  qAn with at least one inequality being strict. In the
presence of transfers, we know from Section 2 that internal stability of coalition S requires
that S(S) =
P
i2S i(S)  0; with i(S) = V i (S)  V i (S n fig).
16Analytical results for the cartel formation game have only been obtained in Barrett (2001), Fuentes-
Albero and Rubio (2010) and Pavlova and de Zeeuw (2013), but they assume a particular payo¤ function
and only two types of players, severely limiting the type of asymmetry.
17External instability requires Q(S) < Q(S [ fjg) and hence the move from S to S [ fjg would be
strictly fully cohesive by Proposition 2.
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In principle, we need to distinguish only two cases which are illustrated in Figure 2.
In case 1, coalition S determines the equilibrium provision level and hence qAS = Q
(S).
Consequently, qAm > q
A
S for all m =2 S. S may be a subcoalition or the grand coalition. In
case 2, an outsider m determines the equilibrium provision, S  N , and hence qAm = Q(S):
Because S is assumed to be strictly e¤ective compared to the all singleton coalition structure,
we must have qA1  qAi < qAm < qAS (with all players i with qAi < qAm being members of S).
[Figure 2 about here]
For both cases (which are identical if qAm = q
A
S ), we distinguish three groups of players in
coalition S. "Weak players" i 2 S1 for which qAi = Q(S n fig) < Q(S) < qASnfig after they
leave coalition S, "strong players" j 2 S2 for which qASnfj) = Q(S n fjg) < Q(S) < qAj is
true and "neutral" players k 2 S3 for which Q(Snfkg) = Q(S)  qAk holds.18 Weak players
have an autarky provision level below the equilibrium provision level when S forms and hence
gain from leaving coalition S, i.e. i(S) = V i (S)  V i (S n fig) < 0. For strong players this
is reversed; they have an autarky level above Q(S) and if they leave, the new equilibrium
provision level is lower and hence they lose from leaving, j(S) = V j (S)  V j (S n fjg) > 0.
For neutral players k(S) = V k (S) V k (S n fkg) = 0. Their autarky provision level is equal
to Q(S) = qAS in case 1 and larger than q
A
S > Q
(S) = qAm in case 2 but not large enough
(qAk  eq in Figure 2) so when they leave coalition S, qASnk  Q(S) = Q(S nfkg) = qAm. That
is, neutral players do not a¤ect the provision level after they leave.19 Clearly, S = S1[S2[S3
noting that the set of players in di¤erent groups do not coincide in cases 1 and 2, as it is
evident from Figure 2. For a given distribution of autarky levels in coalition S, S1 and S2
will be smaller and S3 will be larger in case 2 than in case 1.
We dene eS = S1 [ S2 because only these two groups of players a¤ect stability. Thus,
coalition S  N is internally stable if and only if:
S(S) =
X
j2 ~SnS1

Vj(q
A
y )  Vj(qASnfjg)
 X
i2S1

Vi
 
qAi
  Vi(qAy )  0 (2)
with y = S in case 1 and y = m in case 2. Condition 2 stresses that what strong players
gain by staying inside the coalition (rst term) must be larger than what weak players lose
by staying inside the coalition (second term).
18We use these terms for easy reference, having in mind a weak, strong or neutral interest regarding the
level of public good provision.
19Formally, we have: Case 1 with qAm > q
A
S for all m =2 S: S1 =
n
i j i 2 S ^ qA1  qAi < qAS < qASnfig
o
,
S2 =
n
j 2 S j qASnfjg < qAS < qAj
o
and S3 =
n
k 2 S j qASnfkg = qAk = qAS
o
; Case 2 with qAm < q
A
S for some
m =2 S, S  N : S1 =
n
i j i 2 S ^ qA1  qAi < qAm < qAS < qASnfig
o
, S2 =
n
j 2 S j qASnfjg < qAm < qAS < qAj
o
and S3 =
n
k 2 S j qAm  qASnfkg
o
.
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When is this condition likely to hold? Consider rst the rst term in (2) above. Intu-
itively, for the ~S n S1 group of strong players, a large di¤erence between qAj and qAy implies a
large drop from qAy to q
A
Snfjg when they leave the coalition. Hence, q
A
y and q
A
Snfjg are at the
steep part of the upward sloping part of a strong playersstrictly concave payo¤ function
Vj. In other words, the di¤erence Vj(qAS )   Vj(qASnfjg) is large, i.e. the gain from remaining
in the coalition is large if the distance between qAy and q
A
j is large. For the S1 group of
weak players, we require just the opposite for condition 2 to hold: the closer qAi to q
A
y ; the
smaller the second term in (2) and hence the smaller the gain from leaving coalition S. Thus,
roughly speaking, we are looking for a positively skewed distribution of autarky levels of the
players in coalition S with reference to qAy . The weak players should have an autarky level
close to the autarky level of the coalition in case 1 and close to the autarky level of outsider
m in case 2. In contrast, the strong players should have an autarky level well above the
coalitional autarky level in case 1 and well above the autarky level of player m in case 2. In
the next subsection, we have a closer look how this relates to the underlying parameters and
structure of the benet and cost functions.
6.2 Asymmetry and Stability
In this subsection, we want to substantiate the intuition provided above about distributions
of autarky levels of coalition members which are conducive to internal stability of a coalition.
Analytically, we cannot simply consider di¤erent distributions of autarky levels as they may
be derived from di¤erent payo¤ functions. Therefore, we need to construct a framework
which allows to relate autarky levels to the parameters of the payo¤ functions. Hence, we
consider a payo¤ function which has slightly more structure than our general payo¤ function
(1), but which is still far more general than what is typically considered in the literature
on non-cooperative coalition formation in general and in particular in the context of public
good provision with a summation technology.20 We use the notation vi(Q; qi) to indicate the
20All specications used in the context of the summation technology are a special case of payo¤ function (3)
assuming Q =
P
i2N qi instead of Q = mini2N fqig For instance, the "quadratic-quadratic" payo¤ function,
which has been extensively used for the analysis of international environmental agreements, is obtained by
setting B(Q) = a1(Q)  a22 (Q)2 and C(qi) = a3qi+ a42 q2i , with aj  0 for j = f1; 2; 3; 4g : For example, Barrett
(1994) and Courtois and Haeringer (2012) assume symmtric players and a particular case of this functional
form. In order to replicate their payo¤ function, we would need to set a1 = a; a2 = 1; a3 = 0, a4 = 1; bi = b
8i 2 N; ci = c 8 i 2 N . McGinty (2007) analyzes, using simulations, a game with asymmetric players with
similar functions. In order to retrieve his function, we would need to set aj for j = f1; 2; 3; 4g as in Barretts
game but bi = bi and ci = ci. For other payo¤ functions, including the linear benet function considered
for instance in Ray and Vohra (2001) or Finus and Maus (2008) a similar link could be established. This is
also true for Rubio and Ulph (2006) and Dimantoudi and Sartzetakis (2006) although they analyze the dual
problem of an emission game.
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di¤erence to our general payo¤ function (1) which was denoted by Vi(Q; qi):
vi(Q; qi) = biB(Q)  ciC(qi) (3)
Q = min
i2N
fqig
where the properties of B and C are those summarized in Assumption 1. That is, we assume
that all players share a common function B and C but di¤er in the scalars bi and ci. In
addition, in order to simplify the subsequent analysis, we assume C 000  0 and B000  0 (or,
if B000 > 0, then B000 is su¢ ciently small).21
The following lemma shows the key advantage of payo¤ function (3): it allows us to
characterize the autarky provision of any trivial or non-trivial coalition S, based on a single
parameter.
Lemma 4 Autarky Provision Level and Benet and Cost Parameters Consider
payo¤ function (3). The autarchy abatement level of a coalition S is given by qAS = h (S) ;
where h is a strictly increasing and strictly concave function implicitly dened by C
0(q)
B0(q) = S,
with S =
P
i2S biP
i2S ci
.
Proof: See Appendix B.6.
That is, players can be ranked based on their parameter i through the function h. Players
with higher parameters i will have higher autarky levels. We say a player k is "stronger"
than a player l if k > l and "weaker" if the opposite relation holds. According to our
general analysis above, in case 1, when coalition S determines the equilibrium provision
level, i.e. Q(S) = qAS , weak players are coalition members for which i < S holds, strong
players for which j > S holds and neutral players for which l = S holds. In case 2,
when an outsider player m determines the equilibrium provision level, i.e. Q(S) = qAm; weak
players are coalition members for which i < m holds, strong players for which Snfj) < m
holds and neutral players for which m  j; Snfj) holds. Accordingly, condition (2) can be
written as follows:
S(S;) =
X
j2S2

vj(y)  vj
 
Snfj)
 X
i2S1
[vi (i)  vi(y)] (4)
where y = S in case 1 and y = m in case 2, with S(S;) indicating that internal stability
of coalition S depends on the distribution of i-values of players in S, . We now ask the
question how S(S;) changes if we change the i-values of some players in S, assuming the
21If B000 > 0, a su¢ cient condition for the subsequent results to hold is B000 <  2B00C 00=C 0. See Appendix
B.6.
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same S, but considering di¤erent distributions .22 To simplify the exposition, we focus
on the case where all players in S share a common ci = c and the changes a¤ect only the
parameters bi. However, all the results shown in this section hold if coalitions members share
a common bi = b and marginal changes a¤ect the parameters ci (in the opposite direction;
bi+  corresponds to ci   in Proposition 6 below) instead, and only minor adjustments are
needed to accommodate the case where players di¤er in both parameters. We detail these
adjustments in footnote 23.23
Proposition 6 Asymmetry and Stability Consider payo¤ function (3), with ci = c 8
i 2 S, a strictly e¤ective coalition S with respect to the all singleton coalition structure and
two distributions  and ~ of players i-values in S, where ~ is derived from  by a marginal
change  of two bi-values of players in S, such that bk    and bl+ , implying k  < k and
l+ > l.Then S(S; ~)  S(S;) if:
(i) l < k  y;
(ii) y < k  l;
(iii) k  y < l and fk g  Snfl+g.
Proof: See Appendix B.7.
All three conditions are illustrated in Figure 3, noting that S remains the same through
the marginal changes.
In condition (i), among the set of players with -values below y, the -value of the weaker
player l becomes larger at the expenses of the -value of the stronger player k. The set of
players involved in marginal changes belongs to the group of weak players S1. At the margin,
it includes the possibility that player k is a neutral player before the marginal change.
In condition (ii), among the set of players with -values above y, the  value of a
(weakly) stronger player l is increased at the expense of the -value of a (weakly) weaker
player k. In case 1 where the coalition determines the equilibrium provision level, the set
of players involved in marginal changes of -values is the set of strong players S2 (see also
Figure 2). In case 2 where an outsider determines the equilibrium provision level, the set of
involved players could be strong players S2 but also neutral players S3 (see also Figure 2).
In condition (iii) the marginal changes a¤ect one player with a -value above and one
below y. The marginal changes involve an increase of the -value of a stronger player
22We could conduct a similar comparative analysis of autarky and equilibrium provision levels as a function
of a uniform change of all benet or cost parameters as in Cornes and Hartley (2007b). As this does not
a¤ect stability, we consider only non-uniform changes below.
23Dropping the assumption ci = c 8 i 2 S, respectively, bi = b 8 i 2 S , all conditions in Proposition 6
remain unchanged except condition (ii) for which the additional condition v0l ()jSnl  v0k ()jSnk would be
needed. Propositions 7 and 8, and Corollaries 1 and 2, below, also continue to hold.
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l at the expenses of the -value of a weaker player k. The weaker player will typically
belong to the group of weak players S1, but could also belong to S3 at the margin in the
special case when k = y. The stronger player l will always belong to S2 because otherwise
fk g  Snfl+g will be violated (see Appendix B.7 for details). Important is that the -
value of one player involved in the change is relatively strong within its group because this
ensures fk g > Snfl+g, where Snfl+g is the -value of coalition S if player l leaves coalition
S under distribution ~.
Note that the weak inequality sign in Proposition 6 in terms of stability only applies to
the particular case where both players k and l belong to the set of neutral players S3 (which
is only possible in case 2 in condition (ii)) as all other changes imply S(S; ~) > S(S;)
(see Appendix B.7. for details).
[Figure 3 about here]
Whereas Proposition 6 establishes howmarginal changes of distribution increase S(S;),
nothing is said about the stability of coalition S: In the next Proposition we show that strictly
e¤ective coalitions with one strong player and (S   1) identical weak players are stable.
Proposition 7 Consider a strictly e¤ective coalition S  N with S  m for all players
m =2 S, and a distribution 
 with S such that for all players in S; k = S   s 1 ; except
for one player for which l = S +, with s denoting the cardinality of S and  a positive
number such that S   s 1 > 0. Then S(S;
) > 0.
Proof. For distribution 
, regardless which player leaves coalition S, the subsequent equi-
librium provision will be the provision level in the Nash equilibrium and because there is a
strictly positive aggregate gain for coalition members in S frommoving from ffig; fjg; :::; fngg
to any non-trivial e¤ective coalition S, S(S;
) > 0 must be true.
Proposition 7 implies that there exists always a distribution for which the grand coalition
is stable, i.e. S = N with 
. Furthermore, as the subsequent analysis shows, di¤erent
distributions can be transformed into 
 using a series of marginal changes as the ones
dened in Proposition 6: To illustrate this, consider the distributions formally dened in
Denition 5 and illustrated in Figure 4. For simplicity, we assume that coalition S determines
the equilibrium provision level (case 1).
[Figure 4 about here]
Denition 5 Distributions Consider a coalition S with Q(S) = qAS and the following
distributions of -values (with ci = c 8 i 2 S), generating changes of i-values through a
marginal change of bi-values as explained in Proposition 6, denoting the cardinality of S by s
with s being su¢ ciently large and let  > 0 in sequence 1 and ^ in sequence 2 be the result
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of a sequence of changes  as described in Proposition 6 such that i > 0.
Sequence 1:
(a) Asymmetric distribution  with i = S   and for all j 6= i, j = S + s 1 .
(b) Symmetric distribution 	 with i = S   , j = S + and for all k 6= i; j, k = S,
generated from  by applying a sequence of changes in Proposition 6 using condition (ii).
(c) Asymmetric distribution 
 with i = S   s 1 for all i 6= j, j = S + , generated
from 	 by applying a sequence of changes in Proposition 6 using condition (i).
Sequence 2:
(a) Uniform distribution   with i = S  

(s 1)
2
+ 1  i

^, i = 1; :::; s such that there
are (s 1)
2
players in S1 and
(s 1)
2
players in S2 and one player in S3, assuming s to be an odd
number.
(b) Asymmetric distribution  with i = S   ^4 (s+ 1) for all i = 1; :::; (s 1)2 , k = S for
player k = (s 1)
2
+ 1 and j = S  

(s 1)
2
+ 1  j

^, j = (s 1)
2
+ 2; :::; s for all j 6= i; k,
generated from   by applying a sequence of changes in Proposition 6 using condition (i).
(c) Asymmetric distribution  with i = S   ^4 (s + 1) for all i = 1; :::; (s 1)2 , k = S
for all players k = (s 1)
2
+ 1; :::; s  1 and j = S + ^( s 12 ) + ^ (s 1)(s 3)8 = S + ^ (s
2 1)
8
for
player j = s, generated from  by applying a sequence of changes in Proposition 6 using
condition (ii).
(d) Asymmetric distribution  with i = S   ^8 (s + 1) for all i = 1; :::; s   1 and
j = S + ^
(s2 1)
8
for player j = s , generated from  by applying a sequence of changes
in Proposition 6 using condition (i). Note that  is equivalent to 
 if  = ^ (s
2 1)
8
:
Corollary 1 Distributions and Stability For the distributions dened in Denition 5,
the following relations hold:
Sequence 1: S(S;) < S(S;	) < S(S;
); S(S;
) > 0:
Sequence 2: S(S; ) < S(S;) < S(S;) < S(S;); S(S;) > 0:
Proof. Follows directly from Proposition 6 and Proposition 7.
In sequence 1, we are moving from a (very) negatively skewed distribution  to a
symmetric distribution 	 nally ending up in a (very) positively skewed distribution 
.
Along this sequence, the value of S(S) increases. Whether S(S) is positive or negative
cannot be said at this level of generality, except that we know that nally S(S;
) >
0. Since distribution 
 (like ) can always be generated from any distribution, there
always exists an asymmetric distribution for which the grand coalition is stable according to
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Proposition 7.
In sequence 2, we move from a symmetric, in fact uniform distribution   to a positively
skewed distribution , imposing further changes, generating distribution  and , in-
creasing S(S) on this way, noting that  is a (very) positively skewed distribution. (Note
that Proposition 7 also holds for , as it can be transformed to 
). It is clear that a
similar sequence could have been generated starting from a normal distribution.
Both sequences suggest that asymmetric distributions of autarky levels which are pos-
itively skewed may be more conducive to the stability of coalitions than rather symmetric
distributions if the asymmetric gains from cooperation can be balanced in an optimal way
through a transfer scheme. However, a relative symmetric distribution is more conducive
to stability than a negatively skewed distribution of autarky levels. Hence, asymmetry of
interests as such is not an obstacle to successful cooperation but can be actually an asset
depending on the type of asymmetry. It is conducive to stability if there is no outlier at the
lower end (condition (i) in Proposition 6). At the upper end, this is reversed. Instead of
having many strong players it is better for stability to have one outlier at the top (condition
(ii) in Proposition 6). If there is only one strong player left, he would pay transfers to all
other weak players.
Essentially, what we did in Corollary 1 is to relate distributions to stability so that
Proposition 6 is less abstract. We note that there is no unique measure to compare di¤erent
distributions. Corollary 1 suggests that skewness could be a good measure. This is indeed
the case for most distributions even though we need to mention one caveat: there is not
always a one to one correspondence between the marginal changes listed in Proposition 6 and
skewness. In other words, not all marginal changes which increase S(S) increase skewness
(though most do) as we detail in Appendix C.2, using the Fisher-Pearson coe¢ cient of
skewness.
It is also important to point out that di¤erent from the summation technology where it
is usually easier to obtain stability for smaller than for larger coalitions, this may not be true
for the weakest-link technology. As Proposition 6 highlights, stability only depends on the
distribution of autarky levels of players in coalition S, i.e. the i-values. By adding a player
l outside coalition S to S, a new distribution is generated for which s < s[flg is possible.24
24Consider a game with four players and the following payo¤function vi = bi
 
aQ  12Q2
  c2q2i with a = 10,
c = 1 and bi = f4; 5; 5; 10g for i = 1; 2; 3; 4: Then S(f1; 2; 3; 4g) = 84106069 > 0 whereas S(f1; 2; 3g; f4g) =  1202057 < 0 .
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6.3 Asymmetry and Welfare
From the previous subsection we know how distributions of autarky levels relate to stability.
Now we want to relate this to the global gains from cooperation. To this end, we dene
the global payo¤ of a given distribution  of players i values as W =
P
i2N vi(). We
further dene the gain from forming coalition S by W () := W S  WNa (with the same
conclusion below if we used a relative measure, say W () := W
S
WNa
), with superscript Na
for Nash equilibrium and S for the coalition. These denitions cover the case where S is the
grand coalition and therefore the social optimum.
Proposition 8 Asymmetry and Welfare Gains Consider payo¤ function (3), a strictly
e¤ective coalition S with respect to the all singleton coalition structure and two distributions
 and ~ as dened in Proposition 6. Then, W S() > W S( ~) if
min() = minf1; :::; ng < min( ~) = minfe1; :::;eng
Proof: See Appendix B.8.
Thus, the smaller the smallest autarky level, the smaller the provision level in the Nash
equilibrium and hence the larger are the gains from cooperation, keeping the socially optimal
and equilibrium provision level if coalition S forms constant as assumed by the marginal
changes in Proposition 6 and 8. Thus, by using the concept of a sequence of marginal
changes of bi-values (and/or ci-values), as introduced in Proposition 6, and also assumed in
Proposition 8, very di¤erent distributions can be compared in terms of their global payo¤
implications. Comparing again our distributions dened in Denition 5, we nd that relations
are (almost) reversed.
Corollary 2 Distributions and Welfare Gains For the Distributions dened in Deni-
tion 5, the following relations hold:
Sequence 1 : W (S;) = W (S;	) > W (S;
):
Sequence 2 : W (S; ) > W (S;) = W (S;) > W (S;).
A comparison of Corollary 1 and 2 reveals: distributions which favour stability may be
associated with a lower global gain from cooperation and vice versa. Thus, the "paradox of
cooperation", a term coined by Barrett (1994) in the context of the summation technology,
may also hold for the weakest-link technology. However, a detailed comparison between
Proposition 6 about stability and Proposition 8 about global payo¤s reveals that the message
is not so simple. It is true for the marginal changes imposed in condition (i) in Proposition 6:
the gains from cooperation decrease but the stability value S(S) increases. It is not true for
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the changes (ii) and (iii) which are payo¤neutral but increase the stability value S(S). Also
the skewness of di¤erent i-distributions is only of limited use in characterizing welfare gains,
except when considering the extreme: jumping from a very negatively skewed distribution
to a very positively skewed distribution of i-values through a sequence of marginal changes
decreases the gains from cooperation but increases stability, conrming the "paradox of
cooperation".
7 Summary and Conclusion
In this paper, we have analyzed the formation of institutions which collectively provide a
public good under the weakest-link aggregation technology. This technology underlies a
large number of important regional or global public goods, such as coordination of migration
policies within the EU, compliance with minimum standards in marine law, protecting species
whose habitat cover several countries, compliance with targets for scal convergence in a
monetary union, ghting a re which threatens several communities, air-tra¢ c control or
curbing the spread of an epidemic. Conceptually, we draw on two strands of literature, the
literature on non-cooperative public good provision under the weakest-link technology and
the literature on cooperative public good provision under the summation technology.
The analysis of agreements under the summation technology has typically been conducted
assuming identical players and highly specic functional forms. Moreover, very few papers
analyzed the role of asymmetric players and those are mainly based on simulations and/or
specic examples. Changing the focus of the analysis to the weakest-link technology has
proven fruitful, as we were able to establish a large set of analytical results for general payo¤
functions. For instance, superadditivity and full cohesiveness are important features of a
game, which could generally be established for the weakest-link technology. In contrast, we
are unaware of an equivalent proof for the summation technology.
The analysis of the common assumption of symmetric players turned out to produce
rather trivial results for the weakest-link technology: policy coordination proved unnecessary
as all coalitions are stable and lead to the same Pareto-optimal outcome. Hence, the bulk
of the paper was devoted to the analysis of the role of asymmetric players. We showed
that without transfers, though all coalitions are Pareto-optimal, no coalition is stable which
departs from non-cooperative provision levels. However, if an optimal transfer is used to
balance asymmetries, a non-trivial coalition exists, associated with a provision level strictly
above the non-cooperative level. We analyzed the kind and degree of asymmetry that is
conducive to cooperation: a set of (weak) players, who prefer a similar provision below the
average and one (strong) player with a preference for a provision level well above the average.
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This ensures that there is no weakest-link outlier at the bottom and one player with a very
high benet-cost ratio well above all other signatories, who compensates all other signatories
for their contributions to an e¢ cient cooperative agreement. For such an extremely positively
skewed distribution of interests regarding optimal provision levels, we could show that even
the grand coalition is stable. Unfortunately, the "paradox of cooperation" continues to
hold also for the weakest-link technology: asymmetries which are conducive to stability of
coalitions yield low welfare gains from cooperation, and vice versa.
As monetary transfers play a crucial role in enabling successful cooperation in the light
of asymmetric players, it seems suggestive to analyze the role of in-kind transfers in future
research. However, as argued above, general analytical results will be much more di¢ cult to
obtain if at all. It is also clear that we focused on the most widespread coalition model and
stability concept used in the literature on public good provision, and hence other concepts
could be considered (Bloch 2003, Finus and Rundshagen 2009, Caparrós et al. 2011 and
Yi 1997). Internal and external stability implies that after a player leaves the coalition, the
remaining coalition members remain in the coalition. In the context of a positive externality
game, this is weakest possible punishment after a deviation and hence implies the most
pessimistic assumption about stability. This appears to be a good benchmark, also because
we could show that even for this assumption the grand coalition can be stable with transfers.
Without transfers, other stability concepts would come to similar negative conclusion as
individual rationality is a necessary condition for almost all sensible equilibrium concepts
and without transfers we could show that this condition is violated. Also the assumption
of open membership is a pessimistic assumption regarding stability in positive externality
games as shown in Finus and Rundshagen (2009). In other words, those coalitions which we
have identied as being stable would also be stable under exclusive membership.
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For Online Publication
A Summation Technology: Main Results
The rst order conditions of non-signatories assuming payo¤ function (1), withQ =
P
j2N qj,
gives B0i   C 0i = 0. Total di¤erentiation gives B00i dQ  C 00i dqi = 0 or dqidQ =
B00i
C00i
< 0 and hence
the replacement functions of non-signatories are downward sloping. For signatories, we have
dqi
dQ
=
P
i2S B
00
i
C00i
< 0 and hence taken together the aggregate replacement function is downward
sloping, implying a unique second stage equilibrium for every S  N . Alternatively for reac-
tion functions, we derive for non-signatories B00i dqi+B
00
i dq i C 00i dqi = 0 or dqidq i =
B00i
B00i  C00i < 0
with B
00
i
B00i  C00i >  1. For signatories, we have
dqi
dq i
=
P
i2S B
00
iP
i2S B
00
i  C00i < 0 with
P
i2S B
00
iP
i2S B
00
i  C00i >  1.
If and only if B00i = 0, then replacement and reaction functions have a slope of zero and are
orthogonal but the second stage equilibrium is still unique.
Consider a coalition S with Q(S) and a coalition Snfig with Q(Snfig). We want to
prove Q(S) > Q(Snfig). Suppose the opposite, namely, Q(S)  Q(Snfig) was true.
Then,
8 k =2 S : C 0k(qk(Snfig)) = B0k(Q(Snfig))  B0k(Q(S)) = C 0k(qk(S))
8 i 2 S : C 0i(qk(Snfig)) = B0i(Q(Snfig)) <
X
i2S
B0i(Q
(Snfig))
<
X
i2S
B0i(Q
(S)) = C 0k(qk(S))
implying qk(Snfig)  qk(S) and qi(Snfig) < qi(S) which contradicts the initial assump-
tion. Hence, the game is strictly e¤ective. (Because Q(S) > Q(Snfig) for all S  N ,
even for symmetric players the equilibrium provision vectors are di¤erent for all possible
coalitions.) Because dqk
dQ
 0, the move from Snfig to S implies equal or lower costs but
strictly higher benets for all non-signatories and hence the positive externality property
holds strictly.
A su¢ cient condition for superadditivity to hold is B00i = 0. Moving from Snfig to
S, qk(Snfig) = qk(S) 8 k =2 S and qi(Snfig) < qi(S) 8 i 2 S where qi(S) follows
max
P
i2S Vi(S). Hence,
P
i2S Vi(S) >
P
j2Snfig Vj(Snfig) + Vi(Snfig) must follow. For an
example where superadditivity fails, consider the following payo¤function: Vi = b
 
aQ  1
2
Q2
 
c
2
q2i with a, b, and c positive parameters which are the same for all players. Let n be the
total number of players and s the number of signatories. Then Q(s) = ba(s
2 s+n)
bs2+bn bs+c , qi=2S =
ba
bs2+bn bs+c and qi2S = sqi=2S. Computing  := Vi2S(s = 2)   Vi=2S(s = 1) (in which case
superadditivity and internal stability are the same conditions) gives  =   b2a2c	
2(bn+2b+c)2(bn+c)2
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with 	 = 2(3n2 4n 4)+(2n 8) 1 and  = b=c. Now assume n = 4, then 	 = 282 1
and hence 	 > 0 and  < 0 if  is su¢ ciently large. It can be shown that if  < 0, also
no larger coalition is internally stable. For an example which shows that for no transfers,
not all coalitions are Pareto-optimal and a stable non-trivial coalition may or may not exist,
consider Vi = biQ  c2q2i with bi and c positive parameters. Note that for this payo¤ function
superadditivity holds. Signatoriesequilibrium provision level is given by qi2S =
P
i2S bi
c
and
non-signatories provision level by qi=2S = bic . Assume for simplicity n = 3 and let c = 1
8 i 2 N . Example 1 assumes b1 = 1, b2 = 2 and b3 = 3 and Example 2 assumes b1 = 1,
b2 = 1:1 and b3 = 1:2 with the results displayed in Table 1.
[Table 1 about here]
In Example 1, no non-trivial coalition is stable but all coalitions are Pareto-optimal. In
Example 2, all two-player coalitions are stable, except a coalition of players 1 and 2, but
only the grand coalition and the coalition of players 2 and 3 are Pareto-optimal.
B Weakest-Link Technology: Proofs
B.1 Lemma 1
Applying the denition of internal stability (Denition 2) and positive externality (Denition
4), V i (S)  V i (S n fig  V i (ffig; fjg; :::fzgg) follows with the obvious modication for
transfers.
B.2 Lemma 3
Case 1: Suppose that Q(S) is the autarky level of a player j who does not belong to S[fig.
Hence, qAj  qAi ; qAS and qAj  qAS[fig due to Lemma 2 so that Q(S) = Q(S [ fig). Case 2:
Suppose that Q(S) = qAi initially and hence q
A
j  Q(S) for all j =2 S. Moreover, qAi  qAS
and hence qAi  qAS[fig due to Lemma 2. Thus, regardless whether Q(S [ fig) is equal
to the autarky level of the enlarged coalition, qAS[fig, or equal to the autarky level of some
other non-signatory j, qAj  qAi , Q(S [ fig)  Q(S) must be true. Case 3: Suppose that
Q(S) = qAS before the enlargement, then the same argument applies as in Case 2.
B.3 Proposition 2
Positive Externality: From Lemma 3 we know that Q(S [ fig)  Q(S). Let j =2 S [ fig.
Player j can veto any provision level above his autarky level if qAj  Q(S [ fig), and if
qAj > Q
(S [ fig) he must be at the upward sloping part of his strictly concave payo¤
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function. Hence, V j (S [ fig)  V j (S) must be true. Superadditivity: If the expansion from
S to S [ fig is not strictly e¤ective, weak superadditivity holds. If it is strictly e¤ective, i.e.
Q(S[fig) > Q(S), then either i or S must determine Q(S) before the merger. Then after
the merger qAS[fig(S [ fig) > Q(S) from Lemma 2. Since the enlarged coalition S [ fig can
veto any provision level above qAS[fig(S[fig), moving from level Q(S) towards Q(S[fig) 
qAS[fig(S [ fig) must imply a move along the upward sloping part of the aggregate welfare
function of the enlarged coalition and hence the enlarged coalition as a whole must have
strictly gained. Full Cohesiveness: Positivity externality and superadditivity together are
su¢ cient conditions for full cohesiveness.
B.4 Proposition 4
a) Consider a coalition S with Q(S) and any change through a change of membership of
a group of players which leads to coalition S# with Q(S#). Case 1: If Q(S) = Q(S#),
Vi(S) = Vi(S
#). Case 2: Suppose Q(S#) > Q(S) which requires that player 1 is a member
of S#. Hence, qA1 < Q
(S) < Q(S#) must hold, and at least player 1 must be worse o¤ if
coalition S# forms. Case 3: Suppose Q(S#) < Q(S) which implies that there is a player
j with qAj > Q
(S) who must be worse o¤ if S# forms, regardless whether he is a member
in any of these coalitions. b) Firstly, a strictly e¤ective coalition requires the membership
of the player with the lowest autarky level who will be strictly worse o¤ than in the all
singleton coalition structure (Case 2 in a) above) and instability follows from Lemma 1.
Secondly, leaving a not strictly e¤ective coalition with respect to no cooperation means that
Q(S) = Q(S n fig) and hence internal stability follows trivially. External stability follows
because either joining S such that S [ fjg forms is ine¤ective with respect to S or if it is
strictly e¤ective, then qAj < Q
(S) must be true and hence j is worse o¤ in S [ fjg than as
a single player, as just explained above. Hence, S is externally stable.
B.5 Proposition 5
Because of asymmetry, we have qA1 < q
A
S < q
A
n , and hence a strictly e¤ective coalition S
exists. A strictly e¤ective coalition S compared to the all singleton coalition structure must
include all players i for whom qAi = minfqA1 ; qA2 ; :::; qAn g is true and a player j with qAj > qAi
such that qAi < Q
(S)  qAS from Lemma 2. Because it is strictly e¤ective, qAk  Q(S) > qAi ,
all k =2 S must be strictly better o¤ (strict positive externality holds). Let there be only one
player j in S. Hence, for all i 2 S, S n fig = ffig; fjg; :::fzgg (the all singletons coalition
structure) regardless which coalition member leaves. Therefore, because qAS  Q(S) > qAi ,
S(S) :=
P
i2S(V

i (S)  V i (S n fig)) > 0 follows from the strict concavity of the aggregate
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payo¤ function of S and hence V Ti (S) = V

i (S n fig) + iS(S) > V i (ffig; fjg; :::fzgg).
Hence, S constitutes also a strict Pareto-improvement for all players in S compared to the
all singleton coalition structure and S is internally stable. Now suppose S is externally
stable and we are done. If S is not externally stable with respect to the accession of an
outsider l (which requires qAl > Q
(S)), then coalition S [ flg is internally stable. If it is
also externally stable we are done, otherwise the same argument is repeated, noting that
eventually one enlarged coalition will be externally stable because the grand coalition is
externally stable by denition. Due to the strict positive externality, and Lemma 1, the
eventually stable coalition must Pareto-dominate the all singleton coalition structure.
B.6 Lemma 4
The rst order conditions in an interior equilibrium are c^@C
@q
= b^@B
@q
where b^ =
P
i2S bi and
c^ =
P
i2S ci: Thus, we can dene functions f and h as follows:
f(q) =
C 0(q)
B0(q)
=
b^
c^
=
b
c
= S ,
qAS = f
 1 (S) = h (S) .
To show that h is strictly concave and strictly increasing, we show that f is strictly increasing
and strictly convex:
@f(q)
@q
=
B0(q)C 00(q)  C 0(q)B00(q)
(B0(q))2
> 0 ,
@2f (q)
@q@q
=
C 000(q) (B0(q))2 + 2C 0(q) (B00(q))2
(B0(q))3
 2C
00(q)B0(q)B00(q) + C 0(q)B0(q)B000(q)
(B0(q))3
> 0
which is true due to the assumptions about the rst and second derivatives summarized in
Assumption 1 and the assumptions about the third derivatives mentioned in Section 6.2,
namely, C 000  0 and B000  0 (or if B000 > 0, B000(q) <  2B00(q)C 00(q)=C 0(q)).
B.7 Proposition 6
Before proving the proposition itself, we proof a lemma that is useful for the subsequent
analysis.
Lemma 5 The function ki () = vi(h()) is strictly concave and increasing in ,  2 [0; Ai ].
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Proof. k0i () = v
0
i(h())h
0() is increasing if v0i(h()) =
@v(q)
@q
> 0, as we have shown in
Lemma 4 that h() is strictly concave and increasing and we thus have h0() > 0. Due
to Assumption 1, v is a strictly concave function with respect to qi with a maximum at
qAi = h(
A
i ), and it is therefore increasing for qi 2 [0; qAi ]. As h(i) is increasing everywhere
we also know that vi(h(i)) is increasing for i 2 [0; Ai ] because for any i 2 [0; Ai ] we know
that qi = h(i)  qAi . Thus, we have v0i(h()) = @v(q)@q > 0.
For k to be strictly concave, we need:
k00 () = v00(h()) (h0())2 + v0(h())h00() < 0. (B.1)
We have just shown that v0i(h()) =
@v(q)
@q
> 0 for i 2 [0; Ai ], and by the strict concavity of
v with respect to q = h(), due to Assumption 1, and that of h with respect to , shown
in Lemma 4, we know v00(h()) < 0 and h00() < 0. Hence, k00 () < 0 and k () is strictly
concave.
Before proceeding, let us rst write equation (4) in the text in a more disaggregated form:
S(S;) =
X
i2S
vi(y) 
X
i2S1
vi (i) 
X
i2S2
vi(Snfig) 
X
i2S3
vi (y)  0: (B.2)
After the marginal changes in the distribution mentioned in the Proposition, bk becomes
bk    and bl becomes bl + . These changes do neither a¤ect m nor S =
P
i2S bi=
P
i2S ci;
because ci = c 8 i 2 S.
We now proof the three conditions of the -values listed in Proposition 6.
(i) l < k  y: Consider rst the case where both players are in S1; i.e. l < k < y:
We denote the new valuation function by ~v and, slightly abusing notation, fk g and fl+g
the two values that have changed in ~. The third and fourth sum in condition (B.2) remain
unchanged. In the rst sum in (B.2) the value of y is the same, but the valuation function
has changed for players k and l. However, as vk (y) + vl (y) = ~vk (y) + ~vl (y) still holds,
the aggregate value of the sum does not change. Thus, only the second sum in condition
(B.2) changes and in order for S(S;) < S(S; ~) to hold, we need:
vk (k) + vl (l) > ~vk
 
fk g

+ ~vl
 
fl+g

or
[bkB(h(k))  cC(h(k))] 

bkB(h(fk g))  cC(h(fk g))

(B.3)
+

B(h(fk g)) B(h(fl+g)

>

blB(h(fl+g))  cC(h(fl+g)
  [blB(h(l))  cC(h(l))] .
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Recalling the denition of derivatives, dividing both sides by  and taking the limit  ! 0,
inequality (B.3) becomes:
B(h(fk g)) B(h(fl+g)

+ v0k ()jfk g  v0l ()jl . (B.4)
For  ! 0; k > l implies k   l+ and therefore the rst term on the LHS of inequal-
ity (B.4) is non-negative. Thus, inequality (B.4) always holds as we have v0k ()jfk g &
v0k ()jk = 0 and v0l ()jl = 0, given that fk g < k, k and l maximize vk and vl, respec-
tively, and vi() is an increasing and strictly concave function for  2 [0; Ai ] by Lemma 5.
If player k is initially in S3; i.e. if k = y, the last sum in (B.2) does change, but the relevant
marginal changes are still summarized in condition (B.3) and the proof continues to hold.
(ii) y < k  l: Assume rst k; l 2 S2. Following a similar argument as before, it is
clear that only the third sum in condition (B.2) has changed, and for S(S;) < S(S; ~)
to hold, we need:
vk
 
Snk

+ vl
 
Snl

> ~vk
 
Snfk g

+ ~vl
 
Snfl+g

(B.5)
or 
blB(h(Snl))  cC(h(Snl))
  blB(h(Snfl+g))  cC(h(Snfl+g) (B.6)
+

B(h(Snfk g)) B(h(Snfl+g)

>

bkB(h(Snfk g))  cC(h(Snfk g))
  bkB(h(Snk))  cC(h(Snk)) .
Noting that Snfl+g < Snl and Snk < Snfk g, we have that Snfl+g < Snfk g and the
third term on the LHS of inequality (B.6) is positive. Thus, a su¢ cient condition is:
blB(h(Snl))  cC(h(Snl))
  blB(h(Snfl+g))  cC(h(Snfl+g)
>

bkB(h(Snfk g))  cC(h(Snfk g))
  bkB(h(Snk))  cC(h(Snk))
and dividing both sides by  and taking the limit ! 0 this becomes:
v0l ()jSnfl+g > v0k ()jSnk . (B.7)
Because we have
v0j () = v
0
j(h())h
0() = [bjB0(h())  cjC 0(h())]h0() > 0
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inequality (B.7) can be written as:
blB
0(h(Snfl+g))  cC 0(h(Snfl+g))

h0(Snfl+g)
>

bkB
0(h(Snk))  cC 0(h(Snk))

h0(Snk).
Because l > k, we also know that
blB
0(h(Snfl+g))  cC 0(h(Snfl+g))

h0(Snfl+g)
>

bkB
0(h(Snfl+g))  cC 0(h(Snfl+g))

h0(Snfl+g).
Hence, a su¢ cient condition for inequality (B.7) to hold is
bkB
0(h(Snfl+g))  cC 0(h(Snfl+g))

h0(Snfl+g)
>

bkB
0(h(Snk))  cC 0(h(Snk))

h0(Snk)
or
v0k ()jSnfl+g > v0k ()jSnk .
This holds for Snfl+g < Snk < 
A
k , as vk() is an increasing and strictly concave function
for  2 [0; Ai ] by Lemma 5.
Assume now k; l 2 S3. Then, equation (B.5) simplies to
vk (y) + vl (y) = ~vk (y) + ~vl (y)
and S(S;) = S(S; ~):
If k 2 S3 and l 2 S2 (the opposite is not possible, see gure 2) then equation (B.5)
simplies to
vk (y) + vl
 
Snl

> ~vk (y) + ~vl
 
Snfl+g

or
0 <

blB(h(Snl))  cC(h(Snl))
  blB(h(Snfl+g))  cC(h(Snfl+g))
+

B(h(y)) B(h(Snfl+g)

which holds because v0l ()jSnfl+g > 0 (for the rst two terms) and Snfl+g < y (for the last
term).
Finally, in the "marginal case" where initially y < k  l but nally k  = y < l+,
it is easy to check that the conclusions derived above hold. One just needs to note that in
case k; l 2 S2, Snfk g = y holds.
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(iii) k  y < l and fk g  Snfl+g. Assume rst k 2 S1 and l 2 S2. Because nothing
has changed for the remaining players, in order to have S(S;) < S(S; ~), we need:
blB(h(Snl))  cC(h(Snl))

(B.8)
  blB(h(Snfl+g))  cC(h(Snfl+g)+  B(h(fk g)) B(h(Snfl+g)
>

bkB(h(fk g))  cC(h(fk g))
  [bkB(h(k))  cC(h(k))] .
If fk g > Snfl+g, the third term on the LHS in inequality (B.8) is positive and a su¢ cient
condition for (B.8) to hold is:
blB(h(Snl))  cC(h(Snl))
  blB(h(Snfl+g))  cC(h(Snfl+g)
+ [bkB(h(k))  cC(h(k))] 

bkB(h(fk g))  cC(h(fk g))

> 0 .
Noting that Snfl+g < Snl, dividing both sides by  and taking the limit ! 0, this becomes:
v0l ()jSnfl+g + v0k ()jfk g > 0 .
This holds for Snfl+g < 
A
l and fk g < 
A
k , as vi() is an increasing and strictly concave
function for  2 [0; Ai ] by Lemma 5.
Consider now the case k 2 S3 and l 2 S2: This implies that we are considering the
particular case where initially k = y < l and nally k  < y < l+. Because
now fk g  Snfl+g always holds (because fk g is innitely close to y) we have that
B(h(fk g))  B(h(Snfl+g): Thus, a su¢ cient condition for the equivalent to inequality
(B.8) to hold is:
blB(h(Snl))  cC(h(Snl))
  blB(h(Snfl+g))  cC(h(Snfl+g) (B.9)
+ [bkB(h(k))  cC(h(k))]  [bkB(h(y))  cC(h(y))] > 0 .
We know that k was in S3, i.e. y . k; but we also know that it only was in S3 at the margin,
as (k   ) 2 S1 and thus fk g < y: Hence y = k or slightly above, i.e. y . k: Thus,
either the second square bracket in inequality (B.9) is zero or it is equal to v0k ()jAy > 0: As
the rst square bracket is also positive (see above), the condition always holds.
For the case k 2 S1 and l 2 S3 we have that Snl > Snfl+g  y > k > fk g and hence
the condition fk g  Snfl+g fails. The same holds for the case k; l 2 S3; as in this case
Snl > Snfl+g  y = k > fk g.
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B.8 Proposition 8
Using payo¤ function (3), W =
P
i2N vi =
P
i2N biB(q)  
P
i2N ciC(q) from which it is
evident that the marginal changes of bi (or ci-values) described in Proposition 6 do not
change W . We know that W is strictly concave in q with W 0(qAN) = 0 and q
A
s = h(S) for all
S  N from Lemma 4. By construction, marginal changes do not a¤ect S and m but may
a¤ect the smallest autarky level min Therefore, WNa() < WNa( ~) and W S() = W S( ~).
C Extensions
C.1 Equilibrium Selection
In the main text we applied the criterion of Pareto-dominance to select the equilibrium
provision level (Assumption 2). In contrast, experimental evidence suggests that e¢ cient
outcomes may be di¢ cult to achieve when groups are large. Harrison and Hirshleifer (1989)
found that in small groups coordination on the e¢ cient equilibrium may occur, but Van
Huyck et al. (1990) showed that this result does not hold if the group size is increased. This
negative impact of group size on coordination was conrmed by other experimental studies
for di¤erent variations of the weakest-link game (Cachon and Camerer, 1996; Brandts and
Cooper, 2006; Weber, 2006 and Kogan et al., 2011). Though di¤erences across di¤erent
institutional settings in experiments are interesting, in our context the most relevant nding
is the observation that the larger the number of players, the smaller equilibrium provision
levels will be compared to the Pareto-optimal Nash equilibrium provision level.
There have been some attempts to model these experimental observations. Unfortunately,
all those papers of which we are aware of assume symmetric players, at least symmetric
benet functions and hence are not directly applicable to our general setting. Nevertheless,
we briey discuss them to motivate our analysis below. Cornes and Hartley (2007a) use
a symmetric CES-composition function to model various forms of weaker-link technologies.
They show that at the limit, when the weaker-link approximates the weakest-link, a unique
Nash equilibrium will be selected, though it is not the Pareto-optimal Nash equilibrium; the
Nash equilibrium provision level decreases with the number of players for their assumption.
Other approaches originate from the concept of risk-dominance where players assume that
other players may make a (small) mistake when choosing their provision level. Monderer
and Shapley (1996) use the concept of the potential function which yields the risk-dominant
equilibrium for symmetric players, which is unique and decreases in the number of players. A
similar result is obtained by Anderson et al. (2001) using the concept of logistic equilibrium
and a stochastic potential function, again assuming symmetric players and a linear payo¤
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function.
Extending those theoretical papers to the general case of asymmetric players and general
payo¤ functions as used in our paper would be a paper in its own right. Therefore, we
only take the main conclusions from these papers for the motivation to consider two simple
alternative assumptions: a) eqAS = (n)qAS and b) eeqAS = (n  s+ 1)qAS for all S  N where
n is the total number of players and s the number of players in coalition S. Hence, the
equilibrium provision level if coalition S forms is  times the Q(S) known from Proposition
1. We assume that (n) and (n   s + 1) decrease in n and the latter increases in s. For
(n   s + 1) we may think for simplicity that if s = n , then (1) = 1 and if no coalition
forms, s = 1, then (n). The di¤erence between both assumptions is how we count players
where the second assumption treats the coalition as one player. Hence, anything else being
equal, coalition formation by itself leads to improved coordination for the second alternative
assumption.
The question we pose now is whether our results would still hold or, if not, what would
change. We note that both alternative assumptions about  imply de facto a kind of modest
provision level as considered in the context of the summation technology by Barrett (2002)
and Finus and Maus (2008) which could lead to larger coalitions. For a given coalition S,
autarky and equilibrium provision levels depart from optimality, but this could be compen-
sated by larger coalitions being stable. Conceptually, this is more interesting in the absence
of transfers because then modesty serves as a compensation device. With transfer, transfers
serve as a compensation device and hence it seems obvious to maximize the gains from coop-
eration by choosing Pareto-optimal equilibrium provision levels as we have done in previous
sections. Hence for brevity, we restrict our analysis to the most important items captured in
sections 4 and 5.
Proposition 9 Alternative Equilibrium Selection Consider two alternative assump-
tions: a) eqAS = (n)qAS and b) eeqAS = (n  s+ 1)qAS for all S  N and hence the equilibrium
provision level is ()Q(S).
(i) For both assumptions, the coalition formation game is e¤ective and the properties posi-
tive externality, superadditivity, cohesiveness and full cohesiveness hold (conrming Lemma
3 and Proposition 2).
(ii) Ex-ante symmetric players:
a) For assumption a) all coalitions are stable, deliver the same provision level and payo¤ but
fall short of the social optimum. The larger the di¤erence between 1   (n), the larger the
di¤erence between the equilibrium provision level (global payo¤ ) of stable coalitions and the
socially optimal provision level (global payo¤ ) (slightly modifying Proposition 3).
b) For assumption b), the grand coalition is the unique stable coalition. The larger the
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di¤erence between 1 (n), the larger is the gain in the grand coalition compared to the non-
cooperative equilibrium in terms of global payo¤s and provision level (modifying Proposition
3).
(iii) Ex-ante asymmetric players and no transfers:
For both assumptions a strictly e¤ective coalition with respect to the all singleton coalition
structure may be stable (modifying Proposition 4). For assumption a) the grand coalition
is stable provided that, for all i 2 N for which qAi < qAN , Vi((n)qAi )  Vi((n)qAN) holds
(Vi((2)qAi )  Vi(qAN) under assumption b)). That is, the smaller (n) under assumption a)
((2) under assumption b)), the more likely it is that the grand coalition will be stable. For
assumption a), a su¢ cient condition for the grand coalition being stable is (n)qA1  qAN .
(iv) Ex-ante asymmetric players and transfers:
For both assumptions an e¤ective coalition with respect to the all singleton coalition structure
exists (conrming Proposition 5).
Proof. (i) Slight modications of the proofs of Lemma 3 and Proposition 2 deliver the
result. (ii) Symmetric provision levels and payo¤s for every S  N are obvious. Global
payo¤s are strictly concave in provision levels and eq and eeq increase in (). For assumption
a), stability of all S  N is obvious. For assumption b), Vi2S(S) = Vj =2S(S) for all S  N ,
and Vi2S(S) increases in (n s+1) which increases in s and hence Vi2S(S) > Vj =2S(Snfig) for
all S  N and s > 1. Hence, all coalitions are internally stable but only the grand coalition
is externally stable. (iii) Obvious, noting that for all j 2 N for which qAj  qAN holds, the
incentive to leave is not positive. (iv) Slight modications of the proof in Proposition 5
delivers the result.
Hence, the alternative assumptions do not change the general incentive structure of the
game, all properties established in Lemma 3 and Proposition 2 continue to hold. For assump-
tion a) it is conrmed that ex-ante symmetric players do not render the analysis of coalition
formation interesting for the weakest-link technology. For assumption b) this is di¤erent but
almost by assumption because coalition formation helps to coordinate on provision levels.
The larger coalition S, the larger will be (n s+1) and the equilibrium provision level, and
hence the gain from cooperation compared to the non-cooperative provision level. Result
(iii) relates somehow to the modesty e¤ect. For assumption a) if (n) is su¢ ciently small
and hence the provision level in a coalition is low, the grand coalition will be stable. This
highlights a paradox because the smaller (n), the smaller will be the provision level and
global payo¤s in the grand coalition compared to the social optimum. For assumption b) the
grand coalition can be stable if the provision level in the grand coalition drops su¢ ciently
when one player leaves, i.e. to a modest provision level. This requires that (n   s + 1)
drops su¢ ciently from s = n to s = n  1 (i.e. from (1) = 1 to (2)). For assumption b),
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the paradox disappears if we assume (1) = 1. The grand coalition corresponds to the social
optimum, and the global gain from full cooperation compared to no cooperation increases
with the distance between (1) = 1 in the grand coalition and (n) in the all singleton coali-
tion structure. Finally, result (iv) conrms Proposition 4 about the existence of a non-trivial
stable coalition in the presence of transfers.
C.2 Variance and skewness coe¢ cient
We now dene the conditions under which a marginal increase of stability (through the
changes in Proposition 6) increases the variance and the skewness of the i-distribution.
Applying the standard denition of the variance (second moment) and the Fisher-Pearson
coe¢ cient of skewness to the distribution of i-values (respectively bi-values) we obtain the
following denition:
Denition 6 The skewness coe¢ cient g() of the distribution  of i-values within a coali-
tion is:
g() =
m3()
(m2())
3=2
; m2() =
1
s
X
i2S
(i   S)2 ; m3() = 1
s
X
i2S
(i   S)3 ;
where S = 1s
P
i2S i is the mean, m2() the second moment (variance) and m3() the third
moment of the distribution , respectively, and s is the number of coalition members.
Relating the distributions  and ~ dened in Proposition 6 to the variance and the
skewness coe¢ cient, we obtain the following proposition:25
Proposition 10 Consider a coalition S determining the equilibrium provision level and two
distributions  and ~ as dened in Proposition 6, then m2( ~) > m2() for cases (ii) and
(iii) in Proposition 6 and g( ~) > g() in all three cases if and only if
m2() >
m3()
k + l   2S . (B.10)
25If the assumption ci = c 8 i is substituted by the assumption bi = b 8 i Proposition 10 continues to
hold. For the general case where players di¤er in their bis and their cis, the Proposition would continue to
hold, but the coe¢ cient g() would not any more be the standard skewness coe¢ cient as S =
P
i2S biP
i2S ci
is
not anymore the average over all is (as this is the case if either bi = b 8 i or ci = c 8 i):
41
Proof. All the marginal changes described in Proposition 6 imply that bk becomes bk   
and bl becomes bl + : Hence, m2( ~) > m2() implies
1
n
X
i2Snk;l

bi
c
  bS
c
2
+
1
n

bk
c
  bS
c
2
+
1
n

bl
c
  bS
c
2
<
1
n
X
i2Snk;l

bi
c
  bS
c
2
+
1
n

bk   
c
  bS
c
2
+
1
n

bl + 
c
  bS
c
2
;
which simplies to bk < + bl: This holds for cases (ii) and (iii) in Proposition 6 but not for
case (i). In addition, g( ~) > g() implies
1
n
P
i2Snk;l
 
bi
c
  bS
c
3
+
 
bk
c
  bS
c
3
+
 
bl
c
  bS
c
3
1
n
P
i2Snk;l
 
bi
c
  bS
c
2
+ 1
n
 
bk
c
  bS
c
2
+ 1
n
 
bl
c
  bS
c
23=2
<
1
n
P
i2Snk;l
 
bi
c
  bS
c
3
+
 
bk 
c
  bS
c
3
+
 
bl+
c
  bS
c
3
1
n
P
i2Snk;l
 
bi
c
  bS
c
2
+ 1
n
 
bk 
c
  bS
c
2
+ 1
n
 
bl+
c
  bS
c
23=2 :
This yields inequality (B.10) after tedious algebraic manipulations which are available from
the authors upon request.
Note that for case (i) in Proposition 6 we have that k+l 2S < 0 and hence condition
B.10 holds for any positively skewed distribution, where m3() > 0 (as m2() is always
positive), and for distributions that are not too negatively skewed (where the absolute value
of m3() is smaller than m2() (k + l   2S)). For cases (ii) to (iii) in Proposition 6 we
know that26 k + l   2S > 0, and thus condition B.10 holds for negatively skewed or
not too positively skewed distributions. That is, the intuition that all marginal changes
proposed in Proposition 6 increase skewness is correct for moderately skewed distributions
(whether positively or negatively skewed). For "strongly" skewed distributions (where the
absolute value of m3() is larger than m2() (k + l   2S)), there are exceptions, but one
can always increase stability and skewness at the same time by selecting the appropriate
changes in Proposition 6 (i.e. case (i) for "strongly" positively skewed distributions and
cases (ii) to (iii) for "strongly" negatively skewed distributions).
Proposition 10 has assumed that the coalition determines the equilibrium provision level.
The reason is that if an outsiderm determines the equilibrium, skewness needs to be replaced
by an equivalent concept (coe¢ cient) where the "moments" are dened around m and
not around the average S. In other words, to extend Proposition 10 to any coalition not
26For case (iii) in Proposition 6 note that k + l  2S > 0 if l is further away from the average than k;
which holds if fk g > Snfl+g as assumed in the proposition.
42
determining the equilibrium one needs to substitute g() by a similar coe¢ cient, g^();
dened using m instead of the average of the distribution.
43
  
Figure 1: Replacement Functions and Equilibria for the Weakest-link Technology 
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Figure 2: Weak, Strong, and Neutral Players 
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 Figure 3: Illustration of Proposition 6 
(i) 
(ii) 
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Figure 4: Illustration of Definition 5 
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Distribution 
  Distribution   Distribution   
Distribution 
  Distribution 
  
Distribution 
  Distribution   
Table 1: Coalition Structures and Payoffs 
 Example 1 Example 2 
Coalition 
Structure 
Player 1 Player 2 Player 3 Player 1 Player 2 Player 3 
{{1},{2},{3}} 5.5 10 13.5 2.8 3.03 3.24 
{{1,2},{3}} 4.5 13.5 22.5 3.2 3.74 5.76 
{{1,3},{2}} 2 18 22 3.08 5.45 4.18 
{{1},{2,3}} 10.5 9.5 20.5 5.1 3.52 4.08 
{{1,2,3}} 0 18 36 4.46 5.45 6.44 
 
